MATS 学员:
Satvik Golechha
作者:
Satvik Golechha, Adrià Garriga-Alonso
引用次数
摘要:
Prior studies on deception in language-based AI agents typically assess whether the agent produces a false statement about a topic, or makes a binary choice prompted by a goal, rather than allowing open-ended deceptive behavior to emerge in pursuit of a longer-term goal. To fix this, we introduce $\textit{Among Us}$, a sandbox social deception game where LLM-agents exhibit long-term, open-ended deception as a consequence of the game objectives. While most benchmarks saturate quickly, $\textit{Among Us}$ can be expected to last much longer, because it is a multi-player game far from equilibrium. Using the sandbox, we evaluate $18$ proprietary and open-weight LLMs and uncover a general trend: models trained with RL are comparatively much better at producing deception than detecting it. We evaluate the effectiveness of methods to detect lying and deception: logistic regression on the activations and sparse autoencoders (SAEs). We find that probes trained on a dataset of ``pretend you're a dishonest model: $\dots$'' generalize extremely well out-of-distribution, consistently obtaining AUROCs over 95% even when evaluated just on the deceptive statement, without the chain of thought. We also find two SAE features that work well at deception detection but are unable to steer the model to lie less. We hope our open-sourced sandbox, game logs, and probes serve to anticipate and mitigate deceptive behavior and capabilities in language-based agents.
MATS 是一个独立的研究与教育项目,致力于连接新兴研究人员与 AI 对齐、治理和安全领域的导师。
每期 MATS 项目在加州伯克利进行,为期 12 周。部分学员可选择之后前往伦敦参加为期 6 至 12 个月的延伸项目。